



28 MAR 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM: Harry E. Fitzwater  
Deputy Director for Administration

70-8

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Agency's Information  
Security Program

1. Attached for your information is the Information Security Oversight Office's (ISOO) report on its FY 1984 inspections of the Agency's information security program. As you will note, the ISOO inspections focused on the review of classified documents for proper classification and markings, safeguarding procedures, information security training programs, and the degree of understanding by Agency personnel in making original and derivative classification decisions. With the exception of the marking problems mentioned in Part II. paragraph A. of the report, ISOO found that CIA met or exceeded the standards established by Executive Order 12356 and its implementing directive.

2. In regard to the portion marking problem, Mr. Harold Mason, the ISOO representative, conducted a follow-up inspection at ICS on 26 February 1985 and found only minor inconsistencies in classification markings. During his visit, Mr. Mason offered ISOO's slide program on "classification marking" for use in briefing ICS personnel on the proper procedures for marking documents. I understand the offer was accepted and that arrangements are being made to conduct a refresher training program which should correct this problem.

3. Please express my appreciation to Robert McDonald, Richard Hayes, and Raymond Fioramonti for their cooperation and the excellent briefings they provided during this inspection.



Harry E. Fitzwater

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Attachment:  
As Stated

DDA/OIS/IRMD/IMB/  dcw (21 March 1985)

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**Report of Inspection by  
The Information Security Oversight Office  
of the  
Central Intelligence Agency**

**I. General**

On March 15, May 3 and August 28, 1984, Harold Mason, Program Analyst, Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), inspected the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) information security program to evaluate its compliance with Executive Order 12356. Mr. Mason was accompanied by CIA liaison [redacted]

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Branch. ISOO's FY 1984 inspections continued to concentrate on agency training programs; marking and safeguarding; and in particular, focused on the degree of understanding CIA personnel had of relevant provisions of E.O. 12356 as they relate to original and derivative classification.

**II. Findings**

**A. Classification/Marking**

The agency continues to use its classification guide as a basis for its derivative classification. CIA procedures for using the guide as a basis for a derivative classification are more effective than procedures in most other agencies because CIA officials marking the documents are required to identify the specific item in the guide. This procedure facilitates the conduct of audit trails to determine if the level and duration assignments are proper.

The ISOO analyst did encounter marking problems in some offices within the Community Headquarters. In some instances documents were derivatively classified on the basis of multiple sources, but the derivative classifiers failed to maintain the identification of each source with the file or record copy of the derivatively classified document. In another instance, Community Headquarters received a classified document from another agency that was portion marked. The office in Community Headquarters generated another document from the source document but failed to carry forward the portion marking. The last type of marking problem encountered involved multiple page documents or reports with inserts and attachments. Contributors to the final product are often military and non-military agencies. The military portion mark their input in the beginning of the paragraph and the agency contributions were marked at the end of the paragraph. The Order does permit either method but there should be

consistency within a single report especially since it will generally get wide dissemination and possibly be used as the basis for derivative classification. I recognize that the make up of the Community Headquarters contributes to this type of problem, but careful editing of the final product can resolve the discrepancy. Not all offices had marking problems. Many documents reviewed were portion marked by paragraph, subparagraph, and even specific pieces of information. The marking officials stated that it was extremely important that documents be marked thoroughly because of the sensitivity of the final product.

Some officials inside and outside of the agency feel that one directorate uses the special marking "ORCON" in its reports too frequently. It is their contention that the frequent use of the caveat impedes them from producing a final product or report expeditiously because they must obtain approval to use the information, which in turn, results in undesired delays.

#### **B. Training**

Personnel responsible for the classifying and marking of documents continue to receive effective initial and refresher training. Immediate corrections are made when errors in marking procedures are detected. Training in the handling, safeguarding and use of classified information is an ongoing program with frequent refresher sessions and constant observation.

#### **C. Safeguarding**

The agency has excellent procedures for the transmittal, storage and handling of classified information. Programs and procedures are constantly reviewed to determine if they require upgrading or modification. Individual offices have strict programs for the checking and control of classified information in their possession. No deficiency was detected during the course of the inspections.

### **III. Conclusion**

The Central Intelligence Agency's information security program is in compliance with the Executive Order and the ISOO Directive. The only problems detected were instances of mis-marked documents at Community Headquarters.

**IV. Recommendations**

Documents should be periodically checked at Community Headquarters to determine if they are in compliance with the Order. When deficiencies are detected, the responsible official should be notified and errors corrected.